I. Introduction
The regulation of police cooperation across national and international jurisdictional boundaries differs significantly around the world. It ranges from formal, legally binding international treaties and agreements, to informal customs between agencies. While these are the two most extreme cases of formality and informality, many types of regulation are situated somewhere on a continuum between these two points, such as Memoranda of in Australia and China still relies predominantly on informal police-to-police strategies in border regions. This chapter explores whether formalisation of police cooperation (as in the EU) is a sign of trust, or whether formalisation might be spurred by a lack of trust. Different levels of influence of trust on the three (very) different systems that all require internal law enforcement cooperation within them are determined. The existence (or not) of trust will furthermore be linked to the concept of legitimacy and in particular whether the perception of an agency or system as legitimate influences the readiness to cooperate with it and whether systems cooperating on the grounds of legitimacy tend to formalise their interactions or not.
With a view to the regulation of cooperation strategies, such as cross-border incursions, information exchange and joint investigations, each region examined in this chapter has developed differently. Australia has no formalised legal framework guiding law enforcement activity across borders, but a federal police with powers across all jurisdictions for a select number of offences. The EU has developed a significant number of rather detailed cooperation frameworks, whereas Greater China, as one nation state, still relies predominantly on international informal strategies, such as Interpol and liaison officers to cooperate across borders. At the international level, cooperation is still mainly informal and no legal framework has developed. When addressing trust between the jurisdictions and the impact on regulation, legitimacy needs to be discussed as a significant factor impacting on trust. The systems discussed here have therefore been chosen for their differences in the area of fundamental rights protection, which might impact on both trust between police and formalisation of cross-border law enforcement practices. Also relevant for the formalisation of police cooperation strategies are common approaches to fair trial rights. More broadly, the relationship between similarities and differences in human rights frameworks and the generation of transnational police regulation are likely to be interconnected.
The three systems are analysed with a view to the highest level of diversity at the international level as a benchmark. First, the EU is assessed as a region that has formed its own human rights framework applying to a number of significantly different systems and has developed a high level of formalisation through international (EU) treaties and agreements regulating police and justice cooperation. Second, the chapter addresses Greater China, which 
A. Linking Trust to Legitimacy in the Area of Police Cooperation
In the various studies the author has undertaken in the field, all practitioners interviewed have mentioned trust as a major positive impact factor on cooperation. Trust therefore seems to be crucial in law enforcement cooperation. Psychological research has shown that shared moral norms and values form a basis for trust. The more we perceive others as having a similar value system, the more we consider them trustworthy. 9 Applied to an organisation such as the police, bound by legal frameworks, this should permit a conclusion that a shared adherence to fundamental rights obligations leads to common norms and values, which in turn lead to trust.
The opposite could however equally be true. Another factor that can lead to value commonalities is the need to produce results, to be efficient and to pursue a common goal. On many occasions, this might complicate the maintenance of legal values. However, it is important in the case of police to distinguish shared legal values and shared goals. The distinction might explain why cooperation happens not only between agencies with similar human rights frameworks, but also with those that have very different legal restraints.
The legitimacy of an institution might rest on the legal standards they abide by.
However, research in the area of inter-agency cooperation has shown that it also often comes down to who is known in the other organisation personally. 
B. EU Legal Frameworks
A significant number of bilateral and multilateral cooperation strategies exists between the Member States of the EU. 12 They shall not be outlined in detail, as there are more than 133 EU-level security provisions that highlight more impressively the level of formalisation in this region of the world. 13 However, it should be noted that bilateral and multilateral cooperation initiatives influenced EU-wide formalisation. Some of them spread throughout the Member States of the EU, leading to a de facto harmonisation of policing strategies, such as the Common Centres (or Police and Customs Cooperation Centres).
14 Others started at a multilateral level and were then taken up at EU level, such as the Schengen Convention. With regard to the trust analysis it should be noted that all mechanisms were based on a common goal: the fight against cross-border crime. Seeing that they were first established between neighbouring countries, they were very likely also fostered by personal contacts. For some cooperation mechanisms between EU Member States personal contacts were even the driving force and more crucial than the common goal, like in the Cross-Channel Intelligence
Conference between the United Kingdom, France and Belgium. 15 While there was a clear need to cooperate in this region and hence a common goal, the personal and political 12 Hufnagel, Police Cooperation Across Borders, above n 6, ch 2. animosities were too pronounced to lead to advanced cooperation. This changed when the head of the Kent police was replaced by a chief of police with diplomatic skills. The personal contacts thereby enabled the trust the common goals could not achieve alone.
Furthermore, it could be assumed that between EU Member States a common value system is inherent through the implementation of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Accession without implementation is not possible. However, the situation is more complicated than this as even the same fundamental supranational right might be implemented differently in national criminal procedure, leading to de facto incompatibilities when it comes to cross-border cooperation.
While EU-level legislation in the area of policing and security is extensive, it can be questioned whether this legislation has the power to create legitimacy. Too much and overlapping legislation might even lead to the opposite outcome: a lack of trust towards the system imposing them and a lack of coherence. The recent opt-out of some EU countries with regard to EU security provisions and, most prominently, the United Kingdom 'Brexit' decision might be indicators that extensive supranational regulation can destroy the trust in the supranational entity, which in turn might affect its legitimacy. This does, however, not mean that the trust between the nation states or their legitimacy with regard to police cooperation is affected. The question is, however, whether the implementation of the supranational regulation in the bilateral context creates more trust and legitimacy. While initially a resisted mechanism by practitioners, they are today a commonly used strategy to investigate cross-border crime. turn can lead to greater trust. JITs could be said not to initiate personal contacts for further cooperation, but to enable personal interaction during an investigation that crosses borders.
Another element of trust, common norms/values, is also fulfilled to a certain extent by all three mechanisms as they prescribe a certain way of engaging with each other (eg, competences and data protection regimes). All agents participating in these instruments have to adhere to the same rules even though they might come from different systems. Finally, the common goal defined for these instruments is cross-border law enforcement within the EU.
While this broader goal will be inherent to all agents cooperating through these mechanisms, the more specific goals might nevertheless be different. Consideration in one country might also be given to protecting the identity of a source, or not endangering a further domestic investigation. This could then lead to conflicting goals between agencies. The interesting observation on the three above mechanisms is, however, that they provide the forum to harmonise these goals. For example, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom overcame their major differences in disclosure regimes by resorting to the Europol mechanism. Under UK The knowledge we gain by looking at the different cooperation mechanisms with regard to trust and legitimacy is rather limited. First, the fact that practitioners trust each other if they work more closely together does not prove that the jurisdictions cooperating trust each other more or are becoming more legitimate. No conclusion can be drawn from the above examples with regard to the trust between the systems more generally. What could be inferred is that the fact that practitioners are brought together in the different initiatives under a supranational framework is in itself a sign of trust as it fosters informal cooperation that should not be encouraged between systems that do not acknowledge each other's legitimacy.
The fact that formalised legal frameworks exist enabling practitioner engagement and fostering cooperation could therefore be a sign of trust. This would certainly hold true if it could be observed that systems that do have a legitimacy discrepancy are not formalising their cooperation and are not fostering practitioner contact and training. The next system to be evaluated is therefore Greater China, which encompasses fewer systems, but a greater diversity of values and norms than the EU.
C. Strategies of Police Cooperation in Greater China
While Greater China only includes four distinctly different jurisdictions, the differences between them are great and the challenges to police cooperation significant. and mutual legal assistance. The closeness of Taiwan and Mainland China in the area of police cooperation is very surprising as Taiwan is not recognised by the PRC as a sovereign nation state. However, under the Cross-Strait Agreement both sides had established diplomatic organisations through which cooperation, for example, in criminal matters, could be conducted. 53 A possible explanation is that the PRC and Taiwan both apply the death penalty and have a similar approach to fair trial rights. Cooperation between them, despite political discrepancies, relies on jurisdictional similarities, considering that both systems rely more on Imperial and contemporary Chinese law than Macau and Hong Kong. This stresses that a common value system can lead to closer cooperation, which could be a sign of trust.
However, legitimacy is here put to the test as it could be established that both the existence, as well as the lack of legitimacy can lead to greater trust between organisations as long as they are situated within relatively similar legal systems.
However, the level of engagement between all four systems forming Greater China is more comparable to international cooperation than to the close and regulated EU cross-border . 55 The fact that the two systems chose international cooperation mechanisms (Interpol and liaison officers) rather than measures more tailored to a regional context shows that the assumption of differences is greater than in regions such as the EU with more coherent value systems.
While several bilateral regulated mechanisms exist in Greater China to enhance police cooperation across borders, cross-border law enforcement in this region is still predominantly based on informal and semi-formal cooperation mechanisms. However, between Taiwan and
Mainland China a formalised framework can be observed. At the same time both of these entities have not ratified the ICCPR and still apply the death penalty. It appears that similarities in legitimacy foster the formalisation of cooperation mechanisms. More important than the legitimacy of systems seems to be the sharing of a common value base. Also, if the common goal is considered a priority in the systems, differences in the value base do not hinder cooperation as the anti-corruption cooperation between Mainland China and Hong Kong shows. China therefore provides a very good case study. Between all four systems in Greater China, formalisation did not occur, but bilateral formal cooperation exists between systems with greater similarities or with common goals. It also needs to be mentioned that despite the differences between the four systems there are common education and training initiatives, for example, between Mainland China, Macao and Hong Kong. These initiatives 55 Lo, above n 53, 177.
were described by officers to generate trust and enhance cooperation. 56 Different from the EU case study, this is here a dangerous endeavour as cooperation could lead to human rights infringements. The concept of trust seems to be therefore independent of human rights standards and a common value system in the police cooperation context.
D. Australia
Australia's nine jurisdictions (six states, two territories and federal) are not sovereign nation states, but are comparable in this context as each has distinct criminal laws and procedure as well as a separate police force. Furthermore, the Australian territory is bigger than the EU with 28 jurisdictions; hence there are unique policing problems in remote border regions that have the potential to be tackled by police cooperation mechanisms. Australia has no national human rights charter, but is a party to the ICCPR. Some states have created human rights legislation, but it is of little relevance to fair trial rights. With regard to legitimacy, the states forming the Australian federation should be more homogenous than the EU. All systems derive from the common law and more precisely the British and Irish legal systems. As
Australia is a signatory to the ICCPR, it is applicable in all states. Considering the prominent this strategy has the clear potential to grow beyond the three jurisdictions, attempts to apply this strategy to other states have not been made. 58 The cooperation mechanism is nevertheless far more advanced than anything that has been established in the EU, which shows that similarities (and presumably the underlying trust and similar levels of legitimacy due to these systemic similarities) do create close cooperation.
More important than the NPY lands cooperation is the fact that Australia is, apart from the state and territory police, also policed by federal agencies, such as the Australian Federal therefore be concluded that the higher the levels of similarity with regard to legitimacy are within an entity (Australia has different jurisdictions, but they all derived from one system, while the EU encompasses very diverse civil and common law systems within one human rights framework), the more likely they will be to cede power to the superior entity. This is not to say that there is not a constant quarrel between the Australian state and territory and the federal levels regarding competencies. 59 However, as a system, the trust is here advanced to the point that a common representative agency can be tolerated. This seems to be an even further stage of trust than in the EU.
Furthermore, similar to both the EU and Greater China formal and informal practitioner forums and agencies or education and training initiatives have developed in
Australia encompassing all systems and often initiated by the federal level. This is a consequence of harmonised laws not necessarily translating into harmonised practice.
Harmonised and regional laws have not been able to overcome all differences between constituent jurisdictions, which makes personal level trust building necessary. It is interesting to see that these trust building initiatives can even be identified in the Australian context, despite the pronounced similarity of legal systems and organisational structures among the states. Common training and knowledge exchange therefore seems to be necessary in all systems.
Australia could, apart from the similarity in establishing training initiatives, be seen as a system with great similarities and little formalisation at the bilateral and multilateral levels.
Interviews with practitioners for a previous study, 60 indicated that formalisation would be 59 Hufnagel, Police Cooperation Across Borders, above n 6, ch 3.
60 Ibid. welcomed and that the case-by-case approach can be tiring and highly dependent on single individuals. However, the systems were mostly seen as so legally similar that a real necessity for formalisation from a legal perspective did not exist. Furthermore, when cases cross borders within the Australian federation, they theoretically do fall within the competences of the AFP (at least if they are drug crimes, telecommunication or terrorism related). This has also contributed to a certain reluctance to formalise cooperation frameworks at the multilateral level.
III. Conclusion
The interrelatedness of trust, legitimacy and regulation in the area of police cooperation has proven to be rather different from the 'traditional' views of trust and legitimacy discussed in the first part of this chapter. While the legitimacy debate was shortened by simply assuming that legitimacy levels are related to the implementation of international and regional human rights standards, this has not made the assessment of trust and its effect on legitimacy any easier.
It can be concluded that trust is established in all systems by common goals, common norms/values and personal contacts. This becomes particularly apparent through the fact that all systems foster personal contacts through education and training. However, the three trust indicators do not have to be present at the same time. A common goal can be the driver of trust and even ensuing regulation despite major differences of legitimacy levels between the cooperating systems. It also became very clear that the trust established to promote crossborder law enforcement is not necessarily related to trust between the systems or the other agencies in general. So, other than the assertion by Fichera that 'trust affects legitimacy and legitimacy affects trust, as the more legitimate agencies are the more they are likely to trust each other', 61 the analysis of police cooperation strategies resulted in the view that legitimacy affects trust, but trust does not affect legitimacy in the area of police cooperation.
While police in all three systems addressed can trust each other, even to the point of formally regulating their engagements across borders, this has absolutely no effect on the legitimacy of the other system or how police view that system with regard to legitimacy. The common goal and personal contacts can create the trust independently of the legitimacy of the system. This is likely to produce outcomes detrimental to safeguarding the rights of the defendant. Put differently, if Fichera's assertion is true, we need to redefine 'legitimacy' in the police cooperation context. If we detach legitimacy from the notion that people have to accept the state and twist it to the notion that police as a state agent need to accept the other police, we can rid the legitimacy concept of its human rights component and replace this with common (good or bad) values and goals. This brings to the fore the quintessential dilemma of policing.
What can be asserted is that legitimacy (applying the human rights definition) does influence trust. The common human rights frameworks in the EU have impacted on how police can cooperate and this could similarly be observed in the Australian context. Where a common norm/value basis is present, cooperation mechanisms are more likely to exist. This was also confirmed in the Chinese case study as similar systems were more likely to 61 Fichera, above n 11.
cooperate through a formalised legal basis. If fundamental rights were not an inherent part of legitimacy in the police cooperation context, these observations could not have been made.
However, it must be concluded that similarities of legitimacy levels are just as important in the establishment of trust and cooperation as human rights.
Finally, the stages of trust within an entity comprised of different systems could be categorised as:
1. Bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements based on situational trust (common goals, personal contacts, common norms, but not necessarily all three need to be present to create regulation) when systems show major differences in legitimacy levels.
2. Supranational frameworks as well as multilateral frameworks between all systems within an entity based on trust both between the systems and towards the supranational level (multilateral frameworks being more influenced by common goals and personal contacts, while supranational frameworks are initiated by common goals and related values/norms) when systems show differences at the criminal justice level, but not at the human rights level.
3. Superior agencies established to represent the group of systems based on both the trust between the systems, but also the superior (federal) level (trust between systems based on common goals and personal contacts, trust towards the superior level based on the common norms/values) when systems are similar both at the criminal justice as well as at the human rights level.
